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ARGUMENTS 
I. NOT ONLY DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY FAILING 
TO APPOINT SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL, IT FAILED TO 
INQUIRE ABOUT MR. PANDO'S COMPLAINTS AND THE 
ADEQUACY OF COUNSEL, NOT TO MENTION UTILIZING 
THE WRONG STANDARD TO DENY THE NUMEROUS 
REQUESTS FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL. 
In its Brief, the State argues that Mr. Pando was not 
entitled to the substitution of counsel. See Brief of Appellee, 
pp. 18-22. Utah case law surrounding the "good cause" requirement 
for the substitution of counsel demonstrates quite the contrary. 
The State, in support of its argument, cites State vm Scales, 
946 P.2d 377, 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) for the proposition that a 
defendant must meet a "heavy burden" to show "good cause" for the 
substitution of counsel. See Brief of Appellee, p. 18. In 
Scales, in the course of articulating what is required to 
establish "good cause", this Court stated that not only must a 
defendant show the lack of a meaningful relationship with counsel, 
he or she "'must also establish that the animosity [between the 
defendant and his or her attorney] resulted in such a 
deterioration of the attorney-client relationship that the right 
to the effective assistance of counsel was imperiled.'" Id. 
(quoting Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 622 (Utah 1994)). 
Moreover, " [s]ubstitution of counsel is mandatory when the 
defendant has demonstrated good cause, such as a conflict of 
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interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an 
irreconcilable conflict with his or her attorney." State v. 
Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing United 
States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982) and McKee v. 
Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 
917, 102 S.Ct. 1773 (1982)). "When a defendant is forced to stand 
trial 'with the assistance of an attorney with whom he has become 
embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict,' he is deprived of the 
'effective assistance of any counsel whatsoever' and his Sixth 
Amendment1 right to counsel is violated." Pursifell, 746 P. 2d at 
274. (quoting Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970) 
and citing United States v. Hart, 557 F.2d 162, 163 (8th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 434 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 305 (1977)). 
As the record on appeal demonstrates, Mr. Pando's 
dissatisfaction with appointed trial counsel rose to the level of 
constitutional proportion, requiring the appointment of new 
counsel. In fact, the representations of appointed trial counsel, 
in and of themselves, evinced circumstances manifesting a complete 
breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict between 
appointed trial counsel and Mr. Pando. 
xThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states 
that "[i]n criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
. . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence." 
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Both prior to trial and on the first day of trial, appointed 
trial counsel moved to withdraw, citing the failure to communicate 
and the failure to cooperate as the grounds for withdrawal. The 
motions were summarily denied. In the course of an in-chambers 
conference on the first day of trial, appointed trial counsel 
stated the following: 
THE COURT: Miss Thompson, do you have anything 
further? 
MS. THOMPSON: Yes, I do, your Honor. I decided to try 
myself to contact my client at the cell 
phone 347-5543. At least leave a 
message we were going forward. If he 
had any interest in coming down and 
assisting with the defense, if he was 
able to, et cetera. And he answered the 
phone. Mr. Pando answered the phone. I 
recognized his voice. I believe he 
said, this is Steve, or business office. 
This is Steve or something to that 
effect. I was taken by surprise. 
I don't remember his exact words in 
terms of the greeting. But I most 
certainly recognized his voice. It was 
Mr. Pando. He, in no uncertain terms, 
terminated me. He fired me. Asked me 
to make that representation to the 
Judge. His reasons were that I have 
been doing all the wrong things in 
pursuing his defense. I'm not pursuing 
his theory of the case. He was very 
angry about that. We discussed his 
theory of the case, and that is the 
theory that he wants pursued. And I 
have not pursued that theory. I 
perceived that as trial counsel I'm 
entitled to make strategic decisions, 
but he's very upset that I'm pursuing a 
theory of the case that I am. He's 
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indicated that he's going to be calling 
the bar. That he's hiring a team of 
lawyers and he had no intention of 
coming to court for the trial without 
new counsel. And that as long as I 
continue as his counsel, he would not be 
coming to court. 
(R. 402:93-94) (emphasis added). 
Additionally, at the beginning of the third day of trial, 
appointed trial counsel, again during an in-chambers conference, 
informed the trial court that she had again spoken with Mr. Pando, 
who told her that he was upset because she had not filed a written 
motion to withdraw as counsel. The trial court denied the motion 
because Mr. Pando's failure to appear was voluntary and because 
"his failure to appear is not a basis for the court to not go 
forward with the trial." (R. 406:05-06). 
On that same day, appointed trial counsel filed a Motion to 
Withdraw as Counsel. See R. 2 07-08, Motion to Withdraw as 
Counsel, attached to the Brief of Appellant as Addendum A. 
Appointed trial counsel stated in the Motion that Mr. Pando 
"reiterated that I am pursuing a line of defense with which he 
disagrees; or put another way, I am not pursuing certain lines of 
defense that he wants put forward." (R. 207). Appointed trial 
counsel also stated that "Defendant has expressed that he has no 
confidence in my representation at least in terms of my following 
his requests and recommendations, in pursuing avenues of defense 
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that he believes are vital to his case." {Id.). Moreover, 
appointed trial counsel stated that Mr. Pando had "expressed that 
I had not spent adequate time with him preparing for his defense 
nor had I utilized evidence that he believes vital to his case.'7 
(Id.) . 
Contrary to that represented by the State, the complaints 
communicated to the trial court through appointed trial counsel 
not only established "good cause" for the substitution of counsel, 
but they had such a disadvantageous effect on Mr. Pando's 
representation that they constituted a constitutional violation. 
Not only did the trial court err in its determination that 
good cause existed for the substitution of counsel, the record 
demonstrates that it made little or no effort to discern whether 
Mr. Pando had the opportunity to meet with appointed trial 
counsel. Notwithstanding appointed trial counsel's numerous 
attempts to withdraw as counsel, the trial court failed to inquire 
concerning the adequacy of counsel's representation and the 
condition of the attorney-client relationship between appointed 
trial counsel and Mr. Pando. In fact, the trial court failed to 
inquire even when informed of Mr. Pando's directive to appointed 
trial counsel that she had been discharged for failing, among 
other things, to pursue his theory of the case or utilize vital 
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avenues for his defense.2 u [A] trial court's failure to 
investigate a . . . timely substitution request is per se error." 
State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Not only did the trial court fail to inquire, it failed to 
utilize the appropriate standard when confronted with Mr. Pando's 
requests for the substitution of counsel. Contrary to the 
previously discussed standard for determining when the 
substitution of counsel is warranted, the trial court utilized a 
standard of voluntariness as the basis for denying the requests 
for substitution of counsel.3 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE 
INQUIRY THAT INCLUDED A TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING MR. PANDO'S ABSENCE 
PRIOR TO CONCLUDING THAT MR. PANDO HAD WAIVED 
HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT TRIAL AND THEN 
PROCEEDING WITH THE TRIAL IN ABSENTIA. 
The State argues that Mr. Pando was properly tried in 
absentia because his absence was voluntary. See Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 15-17. This argument, as propounded, ignores the 
2Appointed trial counsel's failure to pursue Mr. Pando's theory 
of the case included not calling Ms. Crissy Pando as a witness at 
trial even though Ms. Pando had appeared to testify pursuant to 
subpoena. 
3The State's claim of waiver is not only unsupported by case law 
but it is inconsistent with well-established case law concerning the 
prerequisites to a finding of waiver of a constitutional right such 
as that in the instant case. See, e.g., State v. Frampton, 73 7 P.2d 
183, 187 (Utah 1987). 
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standard of voluntariness set forth in Utah case law to be 
utilized when a trial court is presented with a trial-in-absentia 
issue. 
According to Utah law, not only do defendants have the right 
to be present at all stages of the criminal proceedings against 
them, the burden is on the prosecution to show that a defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived that right before trial in 
absentia can proceed. See State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 
111(10, 21, 31 P.3d 615, aff'd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937; see also 
State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-11 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The hearing 
or trial should "ordinarily" be continued to obtain further 
information when there is an absence of direct evidence of the 
reason for a defendant's absence. State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, 
Ul2, 79 P.3d 937. 
In State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that 
A defendant charged with a crime is entitled 
to be present at all stages of trial. The 
right to appear and defend in person is a 
constitutional one, but may be waived under 
certain circumstances if the defendant 
voluntarily absents himself from the trial. 
However, the voluntariness may not be 
presumed by the trial court . . . . 
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Id. at 678 (citations omitted) . In light of such, the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he trial court made inadequate 
inquiry into defendant's ability to appear . . . before deciding 
that he had waived his right to be present at trial. Id. 
u
'Voluntariness is determined by considering the totality of the 
circumstances, ' a standard that clearly contemplates some form of 
inquiry appropriate to the facts of the case . . . ." Wanosik, 
2003 UT 46 at ^14 (quoting Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 990). 
In the instant case, the trial court not only failed to make 
an adequate inquiry into the ability of Mr. Pando to appear, it 
failed to inquire, whatsoever, concerning Mr. Pando's complaints 
concerning appointed trial counsel and the adequacy of counsel. 
Such facts were critical to a determination as to voluntariness. 
By so doing, the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry 
appropriate to the facts of the case. Thus, the trial court 
failed to consider the totality of the circumstances prior to 
concluding that Mr. Pando had voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel and then proceeding with trial in absentia. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Mr. Pando respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the 
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case for further proceedings consistent with the Court's 
instructions as specifically set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of February, 2005. 
& WIGGINS, P.C. 
WiggTTis 
eys ^E&p-^Qpellant 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this 3rd 
day of February, 2005: 
Mr. Jeffrey S. Gray 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt LakeX^TF^rtJTX 84114-0854 
14 
ADDENDA 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
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